

Why I Don't Believe in Patriarchy: Comments on Kate Manne's *Down Girl*

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1. Introduction

I am delighted to have this chance to comment on Kate Manne's (2018) book *Down Girl*. It is a powerful, eloquent, courageous, and important book. Since reading it, I have found myself drawing on her ideas, arguments, and terminology to understand our current social world (the term 'himpathy' is absolutely essential to understand the Kavanaugh hearings!). The book is an ideal of what philosophy can offer.

I am also pleased and honored that she has found the idea of an ameliorative analysis helpful and has put it to such good use. Her amelioration of *misogyny* is compelling and exactly what we would hope an ameliorative analysis to do. There are many ideas and arguments throughout *Down Girl* worthy of deep engagement. In these comments, I want to think about the use of the term 'patriarchy' and 'patriarchal.' There are a variety of reasons why some feminists, including myself, have resisted the idea of a patriarchy. In what follows I sketch some of the reasons why, and whether I should continue resisting, given the significant and valuable role it plays in Manne's discussion. Do we live in a patriarchy? How exactly does patriarchy interact with other systems of domination? How should we position Manne's analysis within a broader social theory?

Central to Manne's project is the claim that "misogyny ought to be understood as the system that operates within a patriarchal social order to police and enforce women's subordination and to uphold male dominance" (33). She continues:

What [misogynistic] hostilities are required to have in common is their social-cum-structural explanation: roughly, they must be part of a system that polices, punishes, dominates, and condemns those women who are perceived as an enemy or threat to the patriarchy. (Manne 2018, 34)

More specifically, a patriarchy (or "the patriarchy") seems to be a social order or social milieu within which:

...certain kinds of institutions or social structures both proliferate and enjoy widespread support...from, for example, the state, as well as broader cultural sources, such as material resources, communal values, cultural narratives, media and artistic depictions, and so on. These patriarchal institutions will vary widely in their material and structural, as well as their social, features. But they will be such that all or most women are positioned as subordinate in relation to some man or men therein, the latter of whom are thereby (by the same token) dominant over the former, on the basis of their genders (among other relevant intersecting factors). (Manne 2018, 45)

In the contemporary context, at least, patriarchy is one system among others.

Misogyny hence functions to enforce and police women's subordination and to uphold male dominance, against the backdrop of other intersecting systems of oppression and vulnerability, dominance and disadvantage, as well as disparate material resources, enabling and constraining social structures, institutions, bureaucratic mechanisms, and so on. (Manne 2018, 19)

As I read her, Manne's commitment to patriarchy as a social system is rather minimal, and that her account can avoid the most serious concerns I raise. However, I believe that there are still reasons to resist thinking of the dominant social order, and the order that is the proper target of feminist concern, to be a patriarchy.

2. What is a patriarchy?

The term 'patriarchy' was once narrowly used to characterize kinship systems in which descent, title, and property are inherited through the male line. Such systems are typically found in social groups that grant greater power to men, in general, so a broader use of the term includes any society in which men, as a group, hold greater power than and authority over women and children.

Many feminists in the 1960's and 1970's understood patriarchy to be the system of female subordination that was the proper target of feminism. Radical feminists, in particular, positioned themselves as distinct from "Liberal" feminists by seeing patriarchy as a system of oppression (rather than focusing on the discriminatory attitudes of sexist men), and from Marxist feminists by insisting that patriarchal oppression was distinct from class oppression, sometimes also claiming that patriarchy is a deeper and more basic form of oppression. Socialist feminists of the 1970s and 1980s resisted the effort to prise apart different forms of oppression, noting that in any particular context, structures of oppression are interdependent (Young 1990, Ch. 1; also Eisenstein 1979; Jaggar 1983). They concluded that the target of feminism's action in the recent West should be *capitalist patriarchy*, or *capitalist white supremacist patriarchy*, not simply patriarchy, because these systems of oppression are, in some sense, merged in the modern West. Since then, additional forms of domination have been added to the analysis, yielding a target without a satisfying name other than something along the lines of: *capitalist white supremacist nationalist ableist ageist heteronormative...etc....patriarchy*.

The move to understand our society as a system that somehow embeds and integrates these multiple forms of subordination raises the question whether, and if so how, it is useful to use the term 'patriarchy' for a *system of domination* and whether patriarchy is the narrow or proper target of feminist concern (allowing that feminists should be concerned about all forms of injustice, but supposing here for the purposes of discussion that there is a specific target of feminist efforts concerned with sex/gender subordination). Yet, if we reject the idea of patriarchy, how should we understand feminism's target?

The move to view systems of oppression as interdependent is related to, but distinct from, the move within identity politics to call attention to intersectionality. Intersectionality is typically understood as a feature of identities and/or social positions rather than systems of oppression: according to an intersectional analysis, individuals always experience multiple oppressions (or combination of oppressions and privileges) at the same time and the effects of multiple oppressions/privileging is not simply additive (Spelman 1988; Crenshaw 1989; Collins and Bilge 2016). For example, to appreciate the challenges faced by African-American women, one cannot simply add the generic challenges of being a woman to the generic challenges of being African-American, for racial oppression takes different forms depending on one's gender, and gender oppression takes different forms depending on one's race. Intersectional positions, experiences, and identities are the result of the interdependence of multiple structural injustices. But it is an open question whether it is useful to understand the complex system that gives rise to these injustices as a capitalist system + a patriarchal system + a white supremacist system (etc.). For example, drawing on

Iris Young's (1990) five faces of oppression, one can plausibly argue that working class Latinas face overlapping forms of exploitation, powerlessness, cultural imperialism, and systematic violence. Their experiences, positions, and forms of oppression are intersectional, e.g., Latinas won't be subject to exactly the same form of exploitation or cultural imperialism as Latinos. But should we analyze this by postulating distinct systems – patriarchy, capitalism and white supremacy – that “collide” to result in the specific form of injustice that Latinas face? What does it mean to say that patriarchy (or capitalism, or white supremacy) are separate systems?

Mann's discussion is highly sensitive to the issue of intersectionality, and she frequently and explicitly mentions the limitations of her analysis by acknowledging how it arises out of and draws on her social position as a White woman (Manne 2018, 14, 25-6). She also makes clear efforts to keep the analysis at a level of generality that allows for different meanings, norms, narratives, and the like, that fill in the content of misogyny in a particular context, and also how these meanings affect men in non-dominant positions, e.g.,

[My analysis] leaves room for the diverse range of ways misogyny works on girls and women given their intersectional identities, in terms of the quality, quantity, intensity, experience, and impact of the hostility, as well as the agents and social mechanisms by means of which it is delivered. Misogyny may also involve multiple compounding forms of misogyny if she is (say) subject to different parallel systems of male dominance (depending, again, on other intersecting social factors), or required to play incompatible roles in virtue of multiple social positions which she occupies simultaneously. (Manne 2018, 21)

Note, then, that the question I am asking about patriarchy is *not* the question whether anyone experiences a “pure” form of misogyny, or whether we must identify a “pure” form in order to analyze it, or whether Manne has done due diligence in allowing for the diversity and complexity of women's experiences. Manne has done a wonderful job in making clear her commitment to intersectionality and employed a methodology that embraces her situatedness, while also noting its limitations. My question is not about the extent to which women experience gender in the same way, or are subject to the same kinds and degrees of injustice, but whether it is useful to suppose there is a system of patriarchy at all.

3. Intersecting systems

One possible approach to patriarchy, by analogy with the interpretation of intersectional identities and positions, would be to analyze it as a system that intersects with capitalism, racism, and such, to produce the particular forms of male domination we find. This suggests a systems approach to society. Like ecosystems, societies are made up of sub-systems that work together to sustain the whole. In order for a society to develop and maintain itself, it must find ways to accomplish certain tasks. There must be ways to manage and coordinate, among other things: food production and distribution; sex, reproduction, and childcare; education and the division of labor; health, ageing, and death; shelter and defense; collective decision-making, arbitration, and leadership; leisure activities. Sub-systems are developed to accomplish these various tasks. Larger and more complex societies will also need monetary systems, transportation systems, etc. Is patriarchy one of these systems?

In the old dual-systems models, patriarchy was a system for managing sex, reproduction and childcare that intersected with the capitalist economic system that managed labor and production. For example,

assuming a nuclear family with a caregiver-breadwinner family structure, patriarchy prepares girls to be caregivers and boys to be breadwinners, e.g., by socializing girls and boys to identify with their assigned social roles. On this view, patriarchy is shaped to serve the economic system and the economic system relies on what the sex/gender system provides.

This model failed for several reasons. First, focus on the caregiver-breadwinner family structure is biased: the nuclear family highlighted by this model is historically, geographically, race and class specific. Families of color, poor families, farming families, families in other times and places, have not fit the model. Of course, the caregiver-breadwinner family is only supposed to be an example, but it only seems to capture the workings of a separate patriarchal system because it ignores the race and class dimensions of social reproduction; any model of our current system that attempts to separate the process of gendering from the process of class division and of racialization is going to be inadequate. Second, how, on this view, does power accrue to men? Patriarchy creates separate spheres for men and women. But, as Young argues, the postulated intersection of the economic and reproductive systems does not explain how or why “men in a particular society occupy an institutionalized position of superiority and privilege. For men can occupy and maintain such an institutionalized position of superiority only if the organization of social and economic relations gives them a level of control over and access to resources that women do not have” (Young 1990, 26-7). In other words, what explains the degradation of care work? *Even if* men and women occupy “separate spheres” for the purposes of capitalist production (which, in fact, they don’t), how does the account explain how men, even men exploited under capitalism, gain male privilege? Male power suffuses not just the system of reproduction sphere, but the system of production sphere as well. Neither capitalism, nor the family-based construction of a gender binary, nor their intersection, suffices to explain male domination.

Patriarchy, white supremacy, heteronormativity, ableism and the like, are not separate subsystems of society like the system of food production, or healthcare, that manage a particular good or domain. So treating patriarchy as an intersecting system of this sort, even with the addition of other systems, is not promising. At the very least, we need to think of systems, and the intersection of systems, differently, in order to capture the idea of a patriarchy.

4. Capitalism, not Patriarchy or White Supremacy

In their recent book, *Capitalism: A Conversation in Critical Theory* (2018), Nancy Fraser and Rahel Jaeggi have urged a reconsideration of our current socio-political conditions as a crisis of capitalism. Fraser, in particular, has urged us to “name the enemy,” and on her view, the enemy is capitalism.¹ She argues that identifying capitalism, in a broad sense, as the enemy allows us explain the shape of contemporary injustice and to target our efforts effectively. It is crucial to her view, however, that capitalism is not just an economic system. It is a broad socio-political-economic system. She suggests: “...capitalism is best conceived neither as an economic system nor as a reified form of ethical life, but rather as an *institutionalized social order*.” (Fraser and Jaeggi, 2018, 52)

Fraser, like the intersectionalists, assumes a basic systems approach to society. But there are two important differences. First, she is interested not just in the interactions between systems, but also the

¹ She articulate the point this way in her presentation at the Emancipation Conference in Berlin, May 2018.

inner workings of systems – systems are not mere “black boxes” that produce effects (2018, 8-10). Within a system there will be a variety of forces at work: economic, social, political, cultural, ecological. So, for example, a healthcare system will have to deal with the costs of care, the political management of insurance, the social norms of caregiving, the cultural meaning of disease, the environmental circumstances that exacerbate or reduce risk. In broadening the conception of capitalism, Fraser means to include all of these dimensions.² Second, capitalism, as she sees it, is not just one system among others. It is the overarching social order. The various subsystems and institutions concerned with food, reproduction, health, etc. are subsystems of capitalism. This means that in a capitalist society not only the economic pressures, but also the political, social, cultural, and ecological pressures will be primarily driven by the demands of capital, i.e., in Jaeggi’s words they are driven by the “the dynamic of capital accumulation premised on an orientation towards the expansion of capital as opposed to consumption, coupled with an orientation toward making profit instead of satisfying needs” (Fraser and Jaeggi 2018, 15, see Fraser’s agreement on 18).

Patriarchy is not part of this picture. Capitalism is the site and source of male domination and white supremacy. Capitalist social orders depend on institutional separation of “[i] production and reproduction, [ii] economy and polity, [iii] human and nonhuman nature, and [iv] exploitation and expropriation” (Fraser and Jaeggi 2018, 54).³ Feminist contestations concern the first division, for it is the site where capitalism produces gender; nationalist vs. globalist contestations concern the second⁴; environmentalist contestations concern the third; antiracist contestations concern the fourth. Fraser elaborates, specifically, on gender and race:

Far from being simply given as matters of fact, gender and racial “difference” are products of the power dynamics that assign individuals to structural positions in capitalist society. Gender division may be older than capitalism, but it assumed its modern male-supremacist form only in and through capitalism’s separation of production from reproduction. And the analogous point holds for race. Although “racial difference” as we understand it now may have some affinities with earlier forms of color prejudice, it only took on its modern imperialist White-supremacist guise in and through capitalism’s separation of exploitation from expropriation. Absent these two divides and the subjectivations that accompanied them, neither racial nor gender domination would exist in anything like their present forms. (Fraser and Jaeggi 2018, 111)

The message seems to be that both male domination and white supremacy – *as we know them* – are a product of capitalism. But this leaves it a mystery *how* they are a product of capitalism.

² Any broad system, whether capitalism, patriarchy, heteronormativity, etc. is plausibly going to have these multiple dimensions. This is relevant to the arguments in the previous section: it is not plausible to think of capitalism as the economic system and patriarchy as the child socialization system. Both have economic, social, cultural, (etc.) dimensions.

³ Fraser distinguishes exploitation and expropriation as follows: “Whereas exploitation transfers value to capital under the guise of a free contractual exchange, expropriation dispenses with all such niceties in favor of the brute confiscation – of labor, to be sure, but also of land, animals, tools, mineral and energy deposits, and even of human beings, their sexual and reproductive capacities, their children and bodily organs.” (Fraser and Jaeggi, 2018, 40)

⁴ It is tricky to capture the many kinds of economic, political, social, and cultural contestations that arise in the struggle between a global neo-liberalism/imperialism and a territorial conception of the nation-state. Category [ii] is the site for this.

Fraser suggests that the divisions of production and reproduction (or as she sometimes says, economic and social production) and exploitation/expropriation are both “constitutive” of capitalist society (2018, 110), and “even if the people slotted for reproduction and/or expropriation were not disproportionately biologically female and/or of African descent... [they] would be feminized and/or racialized, subjected to gender and/or racial domination” (Fraser and Jaeggi 2018, 111). On her view, genders are social positions defined by the capitalist distinction between production and reproduction; races are social positions defined by the capitalist distinction between exploitation and expropriation.⁵ The explanatory strategy is to argue that capitalism depends on oppressive institutions that produce these categories, and although they happen to be occupied by people with certain body types, this is a historical contingency. Of course, the fact that this is a historical contingency doesn’t make it any less problematic, or any easier to change.

The details here are obscure, but the general idea seems to be that male domination and white supremacy are so deeply integral to capitalism, that we cannot attempt to address one without the other: “...an exclusive focus on discrimination, ideology, and law is not the royal road to overcoming racism or sexism; it is also necessary to challenge capitalism’s stubborn nexus of expropriation and exploitation, reproduction and production. Both projects require a deeper radicalism – one aimed at structural transformation of the overall social matrix,” (Fraser and Jaeggi 2018, 113) and that matrix is capitalism.

5. Capitalism, Explanation, and the Complexity of the “Social Order”

I agree with much of Fraser’s discussion. It is certainly helpful to see the broad system that shapes and integrates the forms of injustice we abhor and to recognize that the systems of oppression are so deeply intertwined that we cannot undermine them separately. However, it is unclear to me that the best strategy is to identify capitalism as the overarching social order, even if it somehow includes sexism, racism, and other forms of subordination. For one thing, capitalism is as shaped by racism and sexism as they are shaped by capitalism. It is not an accident that mass incarceration disproportionately affects those of recent African descent and that females are disproportionately trafficked; there are forces in addition to the forces of capital that are responsible for these patterns. For another thing, various of the oppressive systems predate capitalism, and are likely to continue after capitalism ends (depending on how it ends), and this is important to explain our particular social order and the ones that follow.

As I see it, racism, sexism, ableism, heteronormativity, etc. each have “logics of their own” that interact with the logics of capitalism and the local material conditions to produce particular social formations. Capitalism did not emerge from nothing, but from prior ways of organizing sex, reproduction, infant care, ethnic differences and ethnic conflict, different bodily capacities, aging, our relation to nature and non-human animals, and such. And in different contexts, capitalism takes up and transforms the prior forms of organization and the narratives that accompany them, in different ways. Gender systems and gender narratives will occur in any context where humans reproduce biologically. We need to ask not just how gender is mapped onto capitalist categories, but how gender “logics” naturalize the gender binary, entrench heterosexuality, distribute care work, eroticize dominance,

⁵ It is unclear to me how this fits with Fraser’s (2013) two-dimensionalist account of gender. It may be that, instead, Fraser’s view is that the capitalist social positions *track* rather than *constitute* gender “as we know it.” If so, then in what sense is gender produced by capitalism, rather than just shaped by capitalism? And if the latter, then plausibly she needs to postulate an additional system or process – patriarchy – that intersects with capitalism after all.

and how these “logics” interact with naturalizing racial logics of animal passions, exotic difference, menial labor, cultural hierarchy, and norms of purity and beauty.

For example, there was a gendered division of labor before capitalism, and capitalism appropriated it and created a new formation that divided care and wage work in a distinctive way. Likewise the marginalization and exploitation of immigrant and captured others did not start with capitalism, but capitalism transformed those practices into a distinctive form of racial exploitation, expropriation, and forced relocation into chattel slavery. The same sort of story is plausible for the normalization of bodies/eugenics. As Shelley Tremain (2017, Ch. 5) has argued, the capitalist apparatus appropriates a conception of health and produces the category of disability through medicalization and a logic of "autonomous" participation in eugenics; in addition, the markets for pharmaceuticals and enhancement are huge. Plausibly, something like religious dimensions of social organization play a substantial role too, since Judeo-Christian capitalism has a particular form, and also its own logic.

If we ask the question: why in the current social system is care work and wage work divided along gender/race lines, i.e., why have these forms of labor congealed with a process of gendering/racialization, the answer isn't just: that's just how things turned out. Or, that's how capitalism works. Neither chance nor capitalism is a sufficient answer. Capitalism is doing gender now; likewise gender is doing capitalism now. “The social order” is capitalist, but it is also sexist, racist, heteronormative, ableist, etc. The institutions that structure it, the forces that drive it, the history that explains it, the culture that supports it, are a product of these interacting forces. Fraser sometimes speaks as if capitalism has a kind of explanatory priority, or explanatory privilege, that warrants naming it as the central phenomenon in our social order. But capitalism is not *the* "engine of history." Societies all face the challenge of solving multiple coordination problems, where the problems and their possible solutions pull us in different directions. It is constant struggle to manage the multiple forces that impinge on us. Explanations of the precarious and dysfunctional equilibria we achieve must be attentive to the many dimensions – biological, geographical, historical, symbolic, material – of these problems.

Rather than prioritizing capitalism, a better model, I think, is to see the social order as “cooking together” a set of ingredients, resulting in a *capitalist white supremacist nationalist ableist ageist heteronormative ...etc.... patriarchal order*, and to treat the mentioned elements as analytical categories that can be used to explain certain features of the system. We can explain why the dough rises because of the yeast, even if the yeast cannot be separated out in the bread. Different elements have explanatory priority in response to different questions.⁶

⁶ I admit that it would be good to have more than an analogy here. We might start by supposing there is a system that has a variety of consequences, e.g., the privileging of white people, the denigration of women, the marginalization of the elderly, the exploitation of workers. The question, then, is how these effects are produced. The relevant claim is that they cannot be explained by reference just to the capitalist features of the system, or sub-systems that are aptly considered “patriarchy” or “capitalism,” or a combination of capitalist and other (patriarchal, racist) features. One model would be to take them to be emergent properties from the interaction of multiple features and sub-systems. Another would be to allow that there are patriarchal and capitalist forces at work, but that we cannot analyze the phenomenon as composed of the effects of one and/or the other. On my view (Haslanger 2017), what counts as a system, and what counts as an adequate explanation is interest-relative. (See also Garfinkel 1981.)

If/when capitalism gives way to other systems, the next ones will appropriate and transform our current capitalist formations and our ways of thinking about sex, reproduction, ethnic difference, and such. We need to be engaged now in how those transformations evolve. So we must ask: how do the current logics of these conditions constrain our understanding of where we are now and how we can create more just ways of managing the multiple and changing social, political, cultural, ecological, and economic demands on societies and, thereby, on us?

6. Patriarchy and Misogyny

It might seem that I've taken us on a long detour from Manne's book project and her characterization of misogyny. The goal has been to understand how we might read her use of the notion of patriarchy in her discussion. Must we see patriarchy as a system of male domination? (Is she assuming an intersectionalist analysis?) How exactly does patriarchy interact with other systems of domination? (Is it a part of a capitalist social order?) How should we position Manne's analysis within a broader social theory?

Manne's commitment to patriarchy seems very minimal. In spite of occasional wording, I don't take her to be making the claim, comparable to Fraser's, that patriarchy (vs. capitalism) is our contemporary social order. And although she is not explicit how patriarchal features of institutions or practices interact with other features of those same institutions or practices, it isn't obvious that she is committed to patriarchy as a sub-system in the way I've characterized the intersectionalists above. Manne's point is just to identify those social systems, institutions, cultures, that have the effect that women are subordinated, allowing that there are many ways of being targeted for such treatment and such targeting will typically not affect all women the same way. Obviously, there are such institutions and practices, and we can say that by virtue of their effects they are patriarchal; and obviously, women are punished for not conforming to them, and it is helpful to identify this name this pattern of policing and punishment as misogyny. This is all we need for Manne's purposes. We can make do with the notion of patriarchy as an analytical category that allows us to identify certain features of our social order to answer questions about the policing of women. Moreover, highlighting the systematic nature of women's subordination, both in the contemporary context and over time, is important.

We should be cautious, however, in drawing conclusions about resistance. Patriarchy is not the system that oppresses us. Patriarchy is not what we should aim to undermine. The noun phrase is misleading and can lead us to think that feminism has a narrow target that is specific to women. Patriarchy doesn't exist (as a system unto itself). The system that oppresses us is a patriarchal system, in Manne's sense, but 'patriarchy' is not an adequate label for that system, any more than, say, 'heteronormativity' or 'ableism' is. If we want a name for the tendency of the social order to target women, we could use the adjective, e.g., we live in a *capitalist white supremacist nationalist ableist ageist heteronormative ...etc.... patriarchal order*.⁷ The order is materially and ideologically structured to shape our various complex identities so that we conform not only to gender norms, but simultaneously a broad range of norms that situate us in unjust relations. Misogyny is analytically distinct from other mechanisms of control – identified functionally by its effects⁸; but in practice it always occurs with other forms of threat, manipulation, and reward. Manne's

⁷ I don't have a name for this system other than a string of adjectives. If we want to name the enemy, as Fraser recommends, we need a better name that allows for expansion, variability, etc.

⁸ I have in mind here a systems model of functions (in contrast to etiological and purposive accounts). On such an account, functions are explanation/interest relative. See Cummins 1975.

analysis is a case study for a range of practices that enforce the system: there are also practices of punishing men who don't conform to their role in dominating women, practices of punishing the disabled who don't conform to their role as needing to be fixed, etc. Because, in fact, gender as we know it is imbedded in a capitalist racist system, there is no escape for any of us without a broad social transformation; we will never succeed unless we keep this vividly in mind and work both within and across social identities. So I continue to resist the term 'patriarchy' and, in many cases, even 'patriarchal' because it risks narrowing of the proper target(s) of our concern and occluding the broad social order that is the true enemy.

Seeing the big picture can certainly make the task seem even more daunting. No wonder there is a point when Manne says, "I give up." (Manne 2018, 300). I sympathize completely with this response. However, I also personally find it a huge relief to broaden the target, to move beyond misogyny, beyond feminism, beyond the "logics" of gender. It isn't all about me and my problems. We are in this together. The problems are our problems. And although I have suffered, the system has also given me privileges that I can leverage against it. This gives me a certain kind of hope, of the sort Rebecca Solnit describes:

Cause-and-effect assumes history marches forward, but history is not an army. It is a crab scuttling sideways, a drip of soft water wearing away stone, an earthquake breaking centuries of tension...I say all this because hope is not like a lottery ticket you can sit on the sofa and clutch, feeling lucky. I say it because hope is an ax you break down doors with in an emergency; because hope should shove you out the door, because it will take everything you have to steer the future away from endless war, from the annihilation of the earth's treasures and the grinding down of the poor and marginal. Hope just means another world might be possible, not promised, not guaranteed. (Solnit 2016, 4)

I don't have hope that I will be successful in undermining the system that oppresses us. Surely this will not happen in my lifetime! Rather, I fight with others who hope that a better world is possible, and act together on that hope. In spite of her moments of despair, I know Kate does too.

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